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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic model of talent investments in a team sports league with
an infinite time horizon. We show that the clubs' investment decisions and the effects of revenue
sharing on competitive balance depend on the following three factors: (i) the cost function of
talent investments, (ii) the clubs' market sizes, and (iii) the initial endowments of talent stock.
We analyze how these factors interact in the transition to the steady state as well as in the steady
state itself.
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1 Introduction
The uncertainty of outcome hypothesis is probably the most unique characteristic of the
professional team sports industry. According to this hypothesis, fans prefer to attend contests
with an uncertain outcome and enjoy close championship races.1 Unlike Wal-Mart, Sony,
and BMW who benet from weak competitors in their industries, FC Barcelona and the
New York Yankees need strong competitors to ll their stadiums. Since weak teams produce
negative externalities on strong teams, many professional sports leagues have introduced
revenue sharing arrangements to, at least partly, internalize these externalities and increase
competitive balance. However, the economic e¤ect of such revenue-sharing arrangements is
heavily disputed in the literature.
Talent investments in professional sports clubs are a dynamic phenomenon. Since the
majority of players sign multiple year contracts, most of the talent acquired in this season will
also be available in the next season. Thus, todays talent investments determine tomorrows
talent stock and expected future prots. From our point of view, a major shortcoming of
the sports economic literature is the disregard of this inter-temporal investment e¤ect.
Almost all contributions consider static models focusing on one period only (e.g., see
Atkinson et al. (1988), Dietl and Lang (2008), Fort and Quirk (1995), Szymanski and Késenne
(2004) and Vrooman (1995, 2008)). Static models, however, do not analyze the dynamics
leading to convergence or divergence of clubsplaying strengths, and therefore they cannot
di¤erentiate between the short and long run e¤ects of revenue sharing on competitive balance.
One exception is El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) who develop a dynamic decision-making
model of a professional sports league. They conrm the "invariance proposition" and show
that revenue sharing does not inuence competitive balance. Their model, however, is based
on some critical assumptions. First, they assume a xed supply of talent because the total
amount of talent is exogenously given in their model.2 Second, the specication of the clubs
1See e.g., Lee and Fort (2008).
2As Szymanski (2004) has shown, the assumption of xed talent supply is often used to justify Walrasian
xed-supply instead of Contest-Nash conjectures. Under Walrasian xed-supply conjectures, the quantity of
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cost function is restrictive since they assume constant marginal costs. Our analysis shows
that the cost function has a signicant e¤ect on the transitional dynamics in the model.
Grossmann and Dietl (2009) analyze the e¤ect of revenue sharing in the context of a
two-period model. They focus on the e¤ect of di¤erent equilibrium concepts (open-loop
and closed-loop equilibria) on clubsoptimal investment decisions. This two-period model,
however, does not allow any conclusions regarding the possible convergence of clubsplaying
strengths. An innite period model is required to analyze these dynamics aspects.
In this paper, we account for the dynamic perspective of clubstalent investments by
developing a dynamic model with an innite time horizon. In each period, two prot-
maximizing clubs invest in playing talent in order to accumulate talent stock, which de-
preciates over time. The available stock of playing talent determines the clubswinning
percentages in each period, which ultimately, determine clubsrevenues. We show that the
clubsinvestment decisions and the e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance depend
on a combination of the following three factors: (i) the cost function of talent investments,
(ii) the clubsmarket sizes and (iii) the initial endowments of talent stock. We analyze how
these factors interact in the transition to the steady state (short run) as well as in the steady
state itself (long run).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the model.
The results are presented in Section 3. In Subsection 3.1, we solve the dynamic problem and
analyze the e¢ ciency conditions. In Subsection 3.2, we compute the steady states and derive
comparative statics. In Subsection 3.3, we analyze the transitional dynamics of the model
for symmetric initial endowments, and in Subsection 3.4 for asymmetric initial endowments.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
talent hired by at least one club owner is determined by the choices of all other club owners.
3
2 Model Specication
The following dynamic model describes the investment behavior of two prot-maximizing
clubs which compete in a professional team sports league. The investment horizon comprises
an innite number of periods in discrete time. We interpret one period as one season, where
expected prots in period t 2 f0; :::;1g are discounted by t with  2 (0; 1).
In each period t, club i 2 f1; 2g invests a certain amount  i;t > 0 into playing talent
in order to accumulate a stock of playing talent, Ti;t  0, which depreciates over time. We
assume that playing talent is measured in perfectly divisible units that can be hired at a
competitive market for talent, generating strictly convex costs c( i;t). Thus, c0( i;t) > 0 and
c00( i;t) > 0 for  i;t > 0, t 2 f0; :::;1g.3
The stock of playing talent Ti;t linearly increases (ceteris paribus) through talent invest-
ments  i;t in period t. Thus, Ti;t is a state variable and is given by the talent accumulation
equation
Ti;t = (1  )Ti;t 1 +  i;t; i 2 f1; 2g; t 2 f0; :::;1g (1)
where  2 (0; 1) represents the depreciation factor. Equation (1) shows that replacements are
necessary in order to maintain the existing stock of playing talent. Before the competition
starts, i.e., in period t =  1, each club i is assumed to have initial endowments of talent
stock given by Ti; 1  0.
In each period t, the talent stock determines the clubswin percentages. The win per-
centage of club i is characterized by the contest-success function (CSF) which maps club
is and club js talent stock (Ti;t; Tj;t) into probabilities for each club.4 We apply the logit
approach, which is the most widely used functional form of a CSF in sporting contests.5 The
3Note that, in Section 3.4.1, we consider linear costs c( i;t) =  i;t with a constant marginal cost para-
meter  such that c0( i;t) =  > 0 and c00( i;t) = 0:
4In the subsequent analysis i; j 2 f1; 2g; j 6= i and t 2 f0; :::;1g, if not otherwise stated.
5The logit CSF was generally introduced by Tullock (1980) and subsequently axiomatized by Skaperdas
(1996) and Clark and Riis (1998). An alternative functional form would be the probit CSF (e.g., Lazear and
Rosen, 1981; Dixit, 1987) and the di¤erence-form CSF (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1989).
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win percentage of club i in period t is then given by
wi(Ti;t; Tj;t) =
T i;t
T i;t + T

j;t
: (2)
Note that club is win percentage is an increasing function of its own talent stock. We dene
wi(Ti;t; Tj;t) := 1=2, if T

i;t = T

j;t = 0. Given that the win percentages must sum up to unity,
we obtain the adding-up constraint: wj = 1  wi.
Moreover, we assume that the supply of talent is elastic. As a consequence, we consider
the so-called Nash equilibrium model rather than the Walrasian equilibrium model, and we
thus adopt the "Contest-Nash conjectures" @ i;t
@j;t
= 0.6
The parameter  > 0 is called the "discriminatory power" of the CSF and reects the
degree to which talent a¤ects the win percentage.7 As  increases, the win percentage for
the club with the higher talent stock increases, and di¤erences in the talent stock a¤ect the
win percentage in a stronger way. In the limiting case where  goes to innity, we would
have a so-called all-pay auction, i.e., a perfectly discriminating contest.
The revenue function of club i is given by Ri(wi;mi) and is assumed to have the following
properties:8 either @Ri
@wi
> 0 and @
2Ri
@w2i
 0 for all wi 2 [0; 1] or 9 wi 2 [0; 1] such that if
wi  wi , then @Ri@wi < 0, otherwise @Ri@wi > 0, and @
2Ri
@w2i
 0 everywhere. In order to guarantee
an equilibrium, we assume that wi  0:5 for at least one club. The parameter mi > 0
represents the market size of club i. To make further progress and to derive closed form
solutions, we have to simplify the model. We assume that the revenue function of club i is
6According to Szymanski (2004), only the Contest-Nash conjectures are consistent with the concept of
Nash equilibrium (see also Szymanski and Késenne, 2004 and Késenne, 2007). However, the disagreement
regarding "Nash conjectures" vs. "Walrasian conjectures" remains an open area for research. For instance,
Fort and Quirk (2007) describe a competitive talent market model, which is consistent with a unique rational
expectation equilibrium (see also Fort, 2006).
7We are grateful to an anonymous referee who suggested that we integrate this parameter in our model.
See also Dietl et al. (2008) and Fort and Winfree (2009) for an analysis of the parameter  in a static model.
8See Szymanski and Késenne (2004) on p. 168.
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linear in its own win percentage and is specied by
Ri(wi(Ti;t; Tj;t);mi) = mi  wi(Ti;t; Tj;t):
This revenue function has the desired properties and is consistent with the revenue func-
tion used e.g., by Dietl et al. (2009), Hoehn and Szymanski (1999), Szymanski (2003) and
Vrooman (2007, 2008).9 Note that Szymanski and Késenne (2004) also use an identical
revenue function in Section III on page 171.
Moreover, we introduce a gate revenue sharing arrangement. The after-sharing revenues
of club i, denoted by bRi, can be written as
bRi = Ri + (1  )Rj =  miT i;t
T i;t + T

j;t
+ (1  ) mjT

j;t
T i;t + T

j;t
;
with  2 (1
2
; 1]. From the home match, club i obtains share  of its own revenues Ri, and
from the away match, it obtains share (1   ) of club js revenues Rj. Note that a higher
parameter  represents a league with a lower degree of redistribution. Thus, the limiting
case of  = 1 describes a league without revenue sharing.
Club is expected prots E[i;t] in period t are given by after-sharing revenues minus
costs, i.e.,
E[i;t] = bRi(Ti;t; Tj;t)  c( i;t):
Club i maximizes its expected discounted prots
P1
t=0 
tE[i;t] with respect to the stream
f i;tg1t=0 and subject to Ti;t = (1  )Ti;t 1+  i;t. We assume that both clubs have an outside
option of zero prots before the competition starts.
In order to solve the model in an innite horizon model, we use the open-loop equilibrium
concept, which facilitates computations.10
9Even though the revenue function is quadratic in own win percentages in the mentioned articles, only
the part where @Ri@wi > 0 is relevant for their analysis. It is obvious that equilibria in which
@Ri
@wi
< 0 holds do
not exist. Moreover, the following proofs hold for all  2 (0;1). However, if  > 1, the revenue function has
both convex and concave parts. Therefore, the existence of a maximum is only guaranteed, if 0 <   1.
10See, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Their paper discusses the di¤erences between the two
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3 Results
3.1 Dynamic Program
We solve the dynamic program for club i by Bellman:11
v(Ti;t 1) = max
 i;t;Ti;t
nbRi(Ti;t; Tj;t)  c( i;t) + v(Ti;t)o s.t. Ti;t = (1  )Ti;t 1 +  i;t
Note that v() represents the clubs value function. Moreover, club i takes Tj;t as given in
period t 2 f0; :::;1g according to the open-loop concept. The associated Lagrangian L with
multiplier t has the following form:
L =  miT

i;t
T i;t + T

j;t
+ (1  ) mjT

j;t
T i;t + T

j;t
  c( i;t) + v(Ti;t) + t[(1  )Ti;t 1 +  i;t   Ti;t]
The corresponding rst order conditions are given by
@L
@ i;t
=  c0( i;t) + t = 0;
@L
@Ti;t
= 
miT
 1
i;t T

j;t 
T i;t + T

j;t
2   (1  )mjT  1i;t T j;t(T i;t + T j;t)2 + @v(Ti;t)@Ti;t   t = 0;
@L
@t
= (1  )Ti;t 1 +  i;t   Ti;t = 0:
(3)
The envelope theorem gives us @L
@Ti;t 1
=
@v(Ti;t 1)
@Ti;t 1
= t(1 ). Using the rst order conditions
and the updated envelope theorem, and assuming that clubs have identical market sizes, i.e.,
concepts. Generally, they argue that in case of many agents the di¤erences between the closed-loop and
open-loop equilibria are negligible. Moreover, Grossmann and Dietl (2009) show that the open-loop and
closed-loop equilibrium coincide in a similar two-period model if costs are linear.
11In order to solve the model, we follow King et al. (1988): In a rst step, we solve the dynamic problem
and analyze the e¢ ciency conditions (Euler equations). Then we compute the steady states (long run), and
afterwards, we analyze the transitional dynamics (short run). Note that, henceforth the results are only
presented for club i. The corresponding results for club j can be found by changing subscripts i and j.
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mi = mj = m,12 we get the following Euler equation for club i:
(2  1) mT
 1
i;t T

j;t
(T i;t + T

j;t)
2
= c0( i;t)  (1  )c0( i;t+1) (4)
Equation (4) reects the well-known inter-temporal trade-o¤: marginal benet of an invest-
ment into talent (left hand side) must equal marginal cost of talent (right hand side) in an
optimum. Note that the marginal benet of an investment is increasing in  andm. The rst
term on the r.h.s of the equation indicates the instantaneous marginal cost of an investment,
whereas the second term on the r.h.s. represents the inter-temporal e¤ect of todays invest-
ment. That is, an investment of one unit today reduces marginal costs tomorrow, which has
to be discounted by (1  ).
Moreover, we can solve the Euler equation (4) recursively forward and get the following
result for club i:
(2  1)m
TX
k=0
(
[(1  )]k T
 1
i;t+kT

j;t+k 
T i;t+k + T

j;t+k
2
)
= c0( i;t)  [(1  )]T+1 c0( i;t+T+1)| {z }
T!1
= 0
Note that the second term on the right hand side vanishes as T converges to innity since
(1  ) 2 (0; 1) such that
(2  1)m
1X
k=0
(
[(1  )]k T
 1
i;t+kT

j;t+k 
T i;t+k + T

j;t+k
2
)
= c0( i;t):
Todays marginal cost of an investment (r.h.s.) equals the sum of todays and (all) discounted
future expected marginal benets (l.h.s.).
12In Section 3.4.1, we extend our model and allow for clubs that have di¤erent market sizes. For this
purpose, we simultaneously have to simplify the cost function by assuming linear costs.
8
3.2 Steady States
Generally, in a steady state all variables grow with a constant rate. In this model, however,
we have a stationary economy such that the growth rate is zero. Thus, Ti;t = Ti;t+1  Ti
in a steady state. Equation (1) implies that  i = Ti in a steady state, i.e., the amount of
playing talent which is lost through depreciation is replaced by newly recruited players.
By neglecting the time subscript t, we rewrite the Euler equation (4) for club i as follows:13
(2  1)mT
 1
i T

j
(T i + T

j )
2
= (1  (1  ))c0( i) (5)
Dividing equation (5) by the corresponding Euler equation for the other club j, we derive
Tj
Ti
= c
0( i)
c0(j)
and can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 test
If mi = mj, then Ti = Tj  T and  i =  j   in the steady state (independent of the
distribution of initial endowments). As a consequence, revenue sharing has no e¤ect on
competitive balance in the long run.
Proof. See Appendix 5.1
Proposition 1 implies that talent investments and the talent stock are identical for both
clubs in the steady state, i.e., there is not only relative convergence but also absolute con-
vergence of talent stocks in the long run as long as clubs have identical market sizes. This
result holds even if clubs started with di¤erent initial endowments Ti; 1 and Tj; 1. It follows
that revenue sharing has no e¤ect on competitive balance in the steady state, and therefore,
the invariance proposition holds in the long run.
Nonetheless, the question remains whether and how quickly the steady state is achieved.
The transitional dynamics are discussed in the next sections, where we show how revenue
sharing inuences competitive balance in the short run, i.e., during the talent accumulation
13Henceforth, variables without a time subscript indicate steady states.
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process. Prior to this, we rst derive the comparative statics of the steady state talent stock
and investment.
According to equation (5) and the results of Proposition 1, we implicitly get the steady
state values T and  = T :
(2  1)m
4T
= (1  (1  ))c0(T ) (6)
Comparative statics lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 test
(i) Talent stock T in the steady state is increasing in m, ,  and , but decreasing in
.
(ii) Talent investment  in the steady state is increasing in m, , ;  and .
Proof. See Appendix 5.2
Proposition 2 (i) shows that a larger market size, a higher discriminatory power, a higher
discount rate and/or a lower degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a higher ) imply a higher talent
stock in the steady state.14 On the other hand, a higher depreciation rate reduces incentives
to accumulate talent in the steady state.
Since higher parameters m, ,  and  imply a higher talent stock T in the steady
state, it is necessary to increase the steady state talent investment  in order to sustain this
higher talent stock T . Thus,  is increasing in the aforementioned parameters as stated in
Proposition 2 (ii). Furthermore, a higher depreciation factor also increases the steady state
talent investment.15
14If the market size and/or the revenue sharing parameter are increasing, then it is quite intuitive that
incentives to invest in talent are also increasing due to higher marginal benets of talent investments. A
higher discriminatory power implies a higher marginal revenue in the steady state, which also leads to a
higher talent stock. Furthermore, we observe a higher talent stock in the long run for a higher discount rate
. Hence, as future expected prots get less discounted, clubs invest more in talent accumulation.
15A higher depreciation factor , however, has two e¤ects on the steady state talent investments  = T ().
First, a higher  reduces the talent stock T () such that the steady state investment  is lower in order to
maintain the talent stock. Second, a higher  also implies that clubs have to invest more in talent in order to
maintain the steady state talent stock. Thus, a higher depreciation factor implies higher talent investments.
The second e¤ect dominates the rst e¤ect in the model such that  is increasing in .
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3.3 Transitional Dynamics with Symmetric Initial Endowments
In this section, we assume that both clubs have identical initial endowments. That is,
the initial talent stock in period t =  1 is the same for both clubs with Ti; 1 = Tj; 1 
T 1.16 This assumption has special implications for the clubsoptimal investment behavior.
Equation (4) implies
Tj;t
Ti;t
=
c0( i;t)  (1  )c0( i;t+1)
c0( j;t)  (1  )c0( j;t+1) (7)
We derive the following results:
Proposition 3 test
If Ti; 1 = Tj; 1  T 1, then  i;t =  j;t   t for all t 2 f0; :::;1g. Therefore, symmet-
ric initial endowments imply that clubs talent investment and talent stock are identical in
each period.
Proof. See Appendix 5.3
Proposition 3 shows that both clubs optimally invest an identical amount in talent in
each period as long as initial endowments of talent stock (Ti; 1 and Tj; 1) are identical. Thus,
we can neglect clubssubscripts i and j in this subsection.
The optimal path of talent investments, however, cannot be explicitly determined in
case of a general cost function. The dynamics are implicitly characterized by the Euler
equation (4), the talent accumulation equation (1), the initial endowments, and the results
of Proposition 3. Even though we are not able to explicitly solve the model, we can plot
the dynamics in a phase diagram, where we have to consider the dynamics of Tt and  t
separately.17
For all initial endowments T 1, there is a unique value  0 such that the dynamic path
leads into the steady state. The unique value  0 is determined by the saddle path in Figure 1.
16Note that, even in a perfectly symmetric contest, symmetric club investments are not compulsory ex
ante. We can show in this section, however, that a symmetric investment behaviour is the unique solution
in our model.
17Note that the dynamics are just approximately true in a phase diagram because the model is based on
discrete time and the phase diagram rather qualies for continuous time. Nevertheless, we use the phase
diagram to strengthen our intuition. In Appendix 5.4, we derive the computations for this phase diagram.
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This saddle path is consistent with the e¢ ciency conditions and the accumulation equations.
Note that if T 1 < T , then initial talent investments  0 are higher than the steady state
talent investments  . Otherwise, if T 1 > T , then initial investments  0 are lower than the
steady state talent investments  . In both cases, the dynamic path leads to the steady state.
Figure 1: Saddle Path in the Phase Diagram
3.4 Transitional Dynamics with Asymmetric Initial Endowments
In this section, we assume that both clubs have di¤erent initial endowments in period t =  1,
i.e., Ti; 1 6= Tj; 1. Again, the Euler equation, the talent accumulation equation and the
initial endowments represent the dynamics of the model and characterize the clubsoptimal
investment behavior.
It is not possible to solve this model explicitly to provide an explicit computation of the
investment path in the transition to the steady state. As a consequence, we further specify
the cost function and consider linear cost in the next subsection. In case of linear costs, we
are able to explicitly compute the steady state variables and to determine the clubsoptimal
investment in each period. In Subsection 3.4.2, we consider a quadratic cost function and
12
derive the optimal investment path through a simulation.18
3.4.1 Linear Cost Function
In this subsection, we consider linear costs c( i;t) =  i;t and, simultaneously, allow for
di¤erent market sizes.19 Without loss of generality, we assume that club i has a larger
market size than club j such that mi > mj > 0. Due to the larger market size, club i
generates higher revenues for a given win percentage than club j. We get the following Euler
equation for club i:
(mi   (1  )mj)
T  1i;t T

j;t
(T i;t + T

j;t)
2
= [1  (1  )]
Hence, club is talent stock in each period t 2 f0; :::;1g is given by
Ti;t =
 (mi   (1  )mj)+1 (mj   (1  )mi)
[1  (1  )] [(mj   (1  )mi) + (mi   (1  )mj)]2
:
Thus, the steady state is attained immediately in the rst period, i.e. in period zero, regard-
less of initial endowments of talent stock. Moreover, we derive that club is talent stock is
higher than club js talent stock in each period because20
Ti;t
Tj;t
=
mi   (1  )mj
mj   (1  )mi > 1;
for all t 2 f0; :::;1g. It follows that club i is the dominant team that has a higher win
percentage in each period t 2 f0; :::;1g compared to club j because

wi;t
wj;t
 1

=
Ti;t
Tj;t
> 1 inde-
pendent of initial endowments. It follows that, even if club j had higher initial endowments
in t =  1, there would be an immediately leapfrogging by club i such that club i would
18Furthermore, we briey discuss the main results of an n-club league with n > 2 in Appendix 5.5.
19Note that we are able to relax the restrictive assumption of identical market sizes in this subsection since
we have simplied the model by using linear costs.
20We assume that mj   (1  )mi > 0 in order to guarantee positive equilibrium investments by club j
(see also Szymanski and Késenne (2004)).
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overtake club j with respect to the talent stock and win percentage in t = 0 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Leapfrogging of Talent Stocks
These results show that, if costs are linear and mi 6= mj, convergence to di¤erent steady
states occurs in the rst period, i.e., in t = 0, such that the league is characterized through
a persistent inequality.21
What is the e¤ect of revenue sharing in this case? We derive that the ratio wi;t
wj;t
is
decreasing in the revenue sharing parameter  for all t 2 f0; :::;1g. As a consequence, we
get the following proposition:
Proposition 4 test
If costs are linear and mi 6= mj, a higher degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a lower ) de-
creases competitive balance (independent of the distribution of initial endowments).
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted.
21In case of identical market sizes, i.e., mi = mj = m, clubstalent stocks also converge in t = 0 but the
steady states are identical with Tt =
(2 1)m
4(1 (1 )) = Ti;t = Tj;t such that the league is perfectly balanced in
the long run. Initial talent investments are then given by  i;0 =
(2 1)m
4(1 (1 ))   (1   )Ti; 1. Thus, club i
invests more in the rst period, the lower its initial endowments Ti; 1. For t  1, both clubs exactly replace
depreciated talent such that talent investments are given by  t = Tt = 
(2 1)m
4(1 (1 )) .
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This proposition shows that revenue sharing produces a more unbalanced league and
thus the invariance principle does not hold. Note that our result in this dynamic setting
generalizes the static nding of Szymanski and Késenne (2004).
3.4.2 Quadratic Cost Function
In this subsection, we consider a strictly convex cost function c( i) = 12
2
i . In order to focus
on the e¤ect of di¤erent initial endowments in the transition, we have to simplify matters
by assuming that clubs have identical market sizes, i.e., mi = mj = m, such that the clubs
talent stocks are identical in the long run. According to equation (4), we derive the following
Euler equation for club i:
(2  1) mT
 1
i;t T

j;t
(T i;t + T

j;t)
2
=  i;t   (1  ) i;t+1 (8)
Together with the talent accumulation equation (1) and the initial endowments of talent
stock Ti; 1, equation (8) determines club is optimal behavior. In contrast to the previous
subsection with linear costs, it is not possible to solve the model explicitly in the case of
quadratic costs to derive equations for the talent stock and investment in each period. How-
ever, we are able to run three di¤erent simulations to get more insights into the transitional
dynamics of the model.
For the three simulations, we x the exogenous parameters as follows:  = 0:05;  =
0:99;  = 1 and m = 100. For this parameterization, the steady state values, which are
independent of initial endowments, are given by T = 91:670 and  = 4:583 for each club.
Moreover, in the rst two simulations, we consider a league without revenue sharing (i.e.,
 = 1), whereas in the third simulation we vary  in order to analyze the e¤ect of revenue
sharing on competitive balance.22
22Note that the initial investments and optimal investment paths are computed by the "shooting method".
We separately choose initial investments for each club in order to undershoot and overshoot the corresponding
steady state talent stocks. In this way, we approximately determine the optimal investment paths.
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Di¤erent Initial Endowments and the Speed of Convergence In a rst simulation,
we concentrate on the e¤ect of di¤erent initial endowments of talent stocks. The results
of the simulation are summarized in Table 1. Initial endowments of talent stock (initial
investments) are illustrated in rows 1 and 2 (3 and 4). Note that we only vary initial
endowments Tj; 1 for club j. For the benchmark case, represented in column 4, we consider
clubs with identical initial endowments Ti; 1 = 50 and Tj; 1 = 50. The variables half(Ti)
and half(Tj) in rows 5 and 6 measure the speed of convergence and indicate the period in
which the talent stocks Ti;t and Tj;t, respectively, have passed half of the way to the steady
state talent stock.
Simulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ti; 1 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Tj; 1 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
 i;0 5:684 5:764 5:803 5:814 5:805 5:782 5:749
 j;0 7:378 6:767 6:253 5:814 5:434 5:101 4:808
half(Ti) 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
half(Tj) 8 8 8 8 8 9 9
V ariation Tj; 1 Tj; 1 Tj; 1 Benchmark Tj; 1 Tj; 1 Tj; 1
Table 1: Di¤erent Initial Endowments and the Speed of Convergence
Table 1 shows that the club with lower initial endowments invests more in talent compared
to the other club in t = 0. It also follows that a higher di¤erence in initial endowments implies
an (inversely) higher di¤erence in talent investments in the rst period. The values half(Ti)
and half(Tj) indicate that heterogeneity with respect to initial endowments does not have
a large impact on the talent stocksspeed of convergence. Both clubs pass half of the way
to the steady state talent stock after 8 or 9 periods.23
Moreover, in contrast to linear costs, convergence to the steady state does not occur in
the rst period if clubs have quadratic costs. Clubstalent stocks smoothly converge over
time.
23Even if Tj; 1 = 200 and Ti; 1 = 50, club i (club j) would pass half of the way in period 10 (period 9).
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Redistribution and the Speed of Convergence In a second simulation, we concentrate
on the e¤ect of redistribution in clubsinitial endowments on the speed of convergence. That
is, in contrast to the rst simulation, we vary not only the initial endowments of club j
but also the initial endowments of club i such that the sum of initial endowments remains
constant. Table 2 summarizes the main results.
Simulation 1 2 3 4 5
Ti; 1 30 35 40 45 50
Tj; 1 70 65 60 55 50
 i;0 6:628 6:425 6:221 6:017 5:814
 j;0 4:999 5:203 5:407 5:610 5:814
half(Ti) 8 8 8 8 8
half(Tj) 9 9 8 8 8
half(wi) 4 4 4 4 0
half(wj) 4 4 4 4 0
V ariation Ti; 1; Tj; 1 Ti; 1; Tj; 1 Ti; 1; Tj; 1 Ti; 1; Tj; 1 Benchmark
Table 2: Redistribution and the Speed of Convergence
The simulation shows that redistribution of initial endowments also does not change
the speed of convergence of the state variables because half(Ti) and half(Tj) do not vary
signicantly.
A leagues policy maker, however, might also be interested in the speed of convergence
of the win percentages. Therefore, we additionally consider the variables half(wi) and
half(wj), representing the period in which the win percentages of club i and club j, respec-
tively, have passed half of the way to the steady state win percentage given by 0:5. In this
case also, we derive that redistribution of initial endowments has no e¤ect on the speed of
convergence of the win percentages.24
Revenue Sharing and the Speed of Convergence In a third simulation, we analyze
how revenue sharing a¤ects the speed of convergence of the win percentages. We consider
24It is clear that in the benchmark case with identical initial endowments (column 5), half(wi) and
half(wj) equal zero because the stock of talent for both clubs will be identical in all periods (see also Section
3.3).
17
the same distribution of initial endowments as in the second simulation, however, now the
revenue-sharing parameter  varies. Table 3 summarizes the main results.
Simulation  = 0:6  = 0:7  = 0:8  = 0:9  = 1
half(wi) 11 8 6 5 4
half(wj) 11 8 6 5 4
Table 3: Revenue Sharing and the Speed of Convergence
According to the simulation, we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 5 test
If costs are quadratic and mi = mj, a higher degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a lower )
implies a lower speed of convergence of the win percentages in the transition (independent of
redistribution of initial endowments).
Proof. Follows from the simulation.
According to this proposition, a leagues policy maker should implement a lower degree
of revenue sharing in order to increase the speed of convergence of the win percentages in
the transition.
Example 1 For initial endowments Ti; 1 = 30 and Tj; 1 = 70, consider Figure 3. This
gure shows that a lower  implies a lower speed of convergence of the win percentages.
Note that the steady state win percentages are given by wi = wj = 0:5 and the variables
representing half of the way to the steady states are half(wi) = 0:4 and half(wj) = 0:6. The
respective win percentages pass half(wi) and half(wj) according to Table 3.25
25Note that we obtain qualitatively similar gures after a redistribution of initial endowments, e.g., Ti; 1 =
40 and Tj; 1 = 60.
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Figure 3: The E¤ect of Revenue Sharing on the Speed of Convergence
4 Conclusion
Investment decisions in professional team sports leagues are a dynamic economic phenom-
enon. Todays talent investments determine tomorrows talent stock and expected future
prots. We develop an innite period model of a professional team sports league to show
that, even if clubs have di¤erent initial talent endowments, the transitional dynamics will
lead to a fully balanced league in the long run as long as clubs have the same market size.
In this case, revenue sharing has no e¤ect on competitive balance and thus the famous
invariance principle holds.
Moreover, we show that the dynamics are inuenced mainly by the cost function. In
case of linear costs, convergence occurs immediately: the steady state is attained in the rst
period. Furthermore, if clubs di¤er in market size, then the steady state variables also di¤er,
and the league is characterized by a persistent inequality regardless of the initial endowments.
In this case, revenue sharing decreases competitive balance.
In case of a quadratic cost function, convergence to the steady state does not occur in the
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rst period. Our simulation further shows that initial endowments a¤ect initial investments.
The club with lower initial endowments invests more in the rst period than the club with
higher initial endowments. Moreover, we derive that redistribution of initial endowments
a¤ects neither the speed of convergence of the state variables nor the speed of convergence
of the win percentages. In this case, revenue sharing decreases the speed of convergence of
the win percentages in the transition.
The current revenue-sharing schemes vary widely among professional sports leagues all
over the world. The most prominent is possibly that operated by the National Football
League (NFL), where the visiting club secures 40% of the locally earned television and gate
receipt revenue. In 1876, Major League Baseball (MLB) introduced a 50-50 split of gate
receipts that was reduced over time. Since 2003, all the clubs in the American League have
put 34% of their locally generated revenue (gate, concession, television, etc.) into a central
pool, which is divided then equally among all the clubs. In the Australian Football League
(AFL), gate receipts were at one time split evenly between the home and the visiting team.
This 50-50 split was nally abolished in 2000.
Our analysis suggests that a league policy maker should implement a lower degree of
revenue sharing in order to increase the competitive balance (in case of linear costs) or the
speed of convergence of clubswin percentages (in case of quadratic costs). Whether clubs
have linear or quadratic costs remains an empirical question and is left for further research.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we prove that Ti = Tj and  i =  j in a steady state. We provide a proof by contra-
diction: Suppose that Tj > Ti: using equation (5) for club i and club j, we get
Tj
Ti
= c
0( i)
c0(j)
.
This implies that c0( i) > c0( j). Strict convexity of the cost function yields  i >  j. Using
 i = Ti and  j = Tj we get Ti > Tj, which is a contradiction to Tj > Ti. By symmetry,
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there is a contradiction, if we suppose that Ti > Tj: Therefore, we conclude that Ti = Tj:
Furthermore, we get  i =  j because  i = Ti and  j = Tj:
Note that Ti = Tj holds independent of . Thus,
T i
T i +T

j
= wi(Ti; Tj) =
1
2
= wj(Ti; Tj) =
T j
T i +T

j
is constant, which implies that revenue sharing has no e¤ect on competitive balance
in the long run. 
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Here, we prove the comparative statics results. First, we dene the function F (T; ; ;m; ; ) 
(2 1)m
4T
  (1 (1 ))c0(T ): In a steady state F (T; ; ;m; ; ) = 0: Using the implicit
function theorem we get:
@T
@m
=  
@F (T;;;m;;)
@m
@F (T;;;m;;)
@T
=   (2  1)

4T
 (2  1) m
4T 2
  (1  (1  ))c00(T ) > 0
@T
@
=  
@F (T;;;m;;)
@
@F (T;;;m;;)
@T
=   (2  1)
m
4T
 (2  1) m
4T 2
  (1  (1  ))c00(T ) > 0
@T
@
=  
@F (T;;;m;;)
@
@F (T;;;m;;)
@T
=   (1  )c
0(T )
 (2  1) m
4T 2
  (1  (1  ))c00(T ) > 0
@T
@
=  
@F (T;;;m;;)
@
@F (T;;;m;;)
@T
=  
m
2T
 (2  1) m
4T 2
  (1  (1  ))c00(T ) > 0
@T
@
=  
@F (T;;;m;;)
@
@F (T;;;m;;)
@T
=    c
0(T )  (1  (1  ))c00(T )T
 (2  1) m
4T 2
  (1  (1  ))c00(T ) < 0
Thus, we conclude that T is increasing in m, , , and , but it is decreasing in , as stated
in Proposition 2(i).
Second, we dene the function G( ; ; ;m; ; )  (2  1) m
4
  (1  (1  ))c0(): In
21
a steady state, G( ; ; ;m; ; ) = 0: Using the implicit function theorem we get:
@
@m
=  
@G(;;;m;;)
@m
@G(;;;m;;)
@
=   (2  1)

4
 (2  1) m
42
  (1  (1  ))c00() > 0
@
@
=  
@G(;;;m;;)
@
@G(;;;m;;)
@
=   (2  1)
m
4
 (2  1) m
42
  (1  (1  ))c00() > 0
@
@
=  
@G(;;;m;;)
@
@G(;;;m;;)
@
=   (1  )c
0()
 (2  1) m
42
  (1  (1  ))c00() > 0
@
@
=  
@G(;;;m;;)
@
@G(;;;m;;)
@
=  
m
2
 (2  1) m
42
  (1  (1  ))c00() > 0
@
@
=  
@G(;;;m;;)
@
@G(;;;m;;)
@
=   (2  1)
m
4
  c0()
 (2  1) m
42
  (1  (1  ))c00() > 0
Thus, we conclude that the steady state value  is increasing in m,   and , as stated
in Proposition 2(ii). Moreover,  is increasing in  i¤ (2   1)m
4
> c0(). Note that
(2   1)m
4
> c0() is always satised. Using the steady state condition (2   1) m
4
=
(1  (1  ))c0(), we get:
(2  1)m
4
=
(1  (1  ))c0()

> c0(), 1 > 
Thus, we get @
@
> 0 i¤ 1 > , which is true by assumption. 
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
In a rst step, we prove that if Ti;t 1 = Tj;t 1  Tt 1, then  i;t =  j;t   t for all t 2 f0; :::;1g.
Suppose that Ti;t 1 = Tj;t 1 and  i;t >  j;t. Equation (4) implies
  Tj;t
Ti;t
=
c0( i;t)  c0( i;t+1)(1  )
c0( j;t)  c0( j;t+1)(1  ) :
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Note that  < 1 because Ti;t > Tj;t: Rewriting the last equation, we yield
 [c0( j;t)  c0( j;t+1)(1  )] = c0( i;t)  c0( i;t+1)(1  ): (9)
Combining equation (9) with  i;t >  j;t we conclude that  i;t+1 >  j;t+1. This result implies
that Ti;t+1 > Tj;t+1, which itself implicates divergence of the state variables Ti;t and Tj;t. It
follows from this divergence of the state variables that the winning probabilities also diverge
across clubs such that the transversality condition (positive expected discounted prots for
both clubs) is violated. However,  i;t =  j;t (t = 0; :::;1) is consistent both with the
combined Euler equation (7) and with the transversality condition. This result proves that
if Ti;t 1 = Tj;t 1  Tt 1, then  i;t =  j;t   t for all t 2 f0; :::;1g.
Using this result, we recursively conclude that both clubs invest an identical amount
in each period. It directly follows that the state variables are also identical. Thus, under
the restriction Ti; 1 = Tj; 1, clubsdecisions are symmetric. This result is summarized in
Proposition 3. 
5.4 Derivation of the Phase Diagram
First, we investigate the dynamics of  t. Combining equation (4) with the results of Propo-
sition 3, yields
(2  1)m
4Tt
= c0( t)  (1  )c0( t+1):
We note that  t+1 =  t+1    t = 0 if (2   1)m4Tt = (1   (1   ))c0( t). Therefore, we
get a decreasing function in the ( ; T ) space if  = 0. This curve is represented in Figure
1. In the northeast of this curve, it holds that  t+1 > 0 such that  increases. In the
southwest of this curve, it holds that  t+1 < 0 and  decreases. The directions of motion
are summarized by the vertical arrows in Figure 1.
Second, we investigate the dynamics of Tt. The talent accumulation equation combined
with Proposition 3 implies that Tt = (1  )Tt 1+  t , Tt =  Tt 1+  t. Hence, Tt = 0
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if  t = Tt. Note that  t = Tt is also represented in Figure 1. In the southeast of this
curve, it holds that Tt < 0, whereas in the northwest it holds that Tt > 0. Once again,
the horizontal arrows indicate the directions of motion in the ( ; T ) space.
5.5 Extension: n-Club League
In this extension, we consider a league with n > 2 clubs and show that many results from
the two-club league still hold. We allow for heterogeneous clubs with respect to initial
endowments but assume that clubs have identical market sizes, i.e., mi = m for all i 2
f1; :::; ng. Moreover, we consider a league without revenue sharing, i.e.,  = 1, because we
focus on the e¤ect of more clubs.
The win percentage of club i 2 f1; :::; ng is now dened as
wi =
n
2
T i;tPn
j=1 T

j;t
We derive the following Euler equation for club i 2 f1; :::; ng
n
2
mT  1i;t
P
j 6=i T

j;tPn
j=1 T

j;t
2 = c0( i;t)  (1  )c0( i;t+1);
with t 2 f0; :::;1g. As in the two-club league, in the steady state it holds that Ti = T and
 i =  = T for all i 2 f1; :::; ng. Moreover, we obtain the following implicit function for the
talent stock in the steady state
n  1
n
m
2T
= [1  (1  )]c0(T ):
It is easy to see that the talent stock in the steady state is increasing with the number of
clubs in the league.
In the following, we specify the cost function by assuming linear costs c( i;t) =  i;t.
In this case, we are able to determine the transitional path of the talent stocks. As in the
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two-club league, the steady state is immediately attained in the rst period, regardless of
initial endowments of talent stock. The steady state is given by
Tt =
n  1
n
m
2[1  (1  )] = T
with t 2 f0; :::;1g. According to the last equation, we derive that a higher number of clubs
in the league also increases the talent stock in each period.
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